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Attorneys' Fee Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984: Can We Protect Against Sham
Transfers to Attorneys?
The country's defense bar has widely criticized the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984 (CFA) 1 since its enactment. 2 Congress enacted
CFA, part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,3 as an
amendment to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)4 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute (CCE).5 Prior
to 1984, RICO and CCE contained provisions that called for the criminal
forfeiture of a convicted defendant's assets which could be identified as
"fruits of the crime."'6 With the enactment of CFA, however, Congress
made it clear that a prosecutor could obtain forfeiture of such assets from
a third party to whom the defendant had transferred the assets. 7 The
question has arisen as to whether prosecutors can use CFA to obtain for-
feiture of attorneys' fees paid by a convicted defendant. 8 TheJustice De-
partment has insisted that the third party forfeiture provision in CFA
applies to a defendant's attorneys' fees. 9 On the other hand, some de-
fense attorneys have argued that Congress did not intend CFA to apply
to attorneys' fees,10 and that the forfeiture of attorneys' fees under the
provisions of CFA would violate the defendant's sixth amendment right
to counsel.' The courts are divided as to whether CFA can be applied to
obtain forfeiture of attorneys' fees.'
2
1 Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, §§ 301-322, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-2057 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 18, 19, 21, 26, and 28 U.S.C.). This note concerns only the criminal forfeiture provisions of
CFA codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963, and 21 U.S.C. §§ 853 (Supp. III 1985). All references to CFA in
this note will refer only to these criminal forfeiture provisions.
2 See, e.g., The Forfeiture of Attorney Fees in Criminal Cases: A Call for Immediate Remedial Action, 41
REc. A.B. Crr N.Y. 469 (1986) [hereinafter N.Y. Bar Rep.].
3 Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976-2194 (1984).
4 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
5 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982).
6 18 U.S.C. § 1963, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Supp. III 1985).
7 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c), 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. III 1985). See also United States v. Long, 654
F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981) (pre-CFA case allowing forfeiture of assets transferred to third parties);
United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (same).
8 United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp.
452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.) [hereinafter Simels], rev'd on other grounds,
767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
9 Justice Department Guidelines on Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees, reprinted in 38 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA)
3001 (Oct. 2, 1985) [hereinafter D.O.J. Guidelines].
10 See, e.g., Krieger& Van Dusen, The Lawyer, the Client, and the New Law, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 737
(1984); N.Y. Bar Rep., supra note 2.
11 Id.
12 Compare Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (holding that application of CFA's third party forfeiture provi-
sions to private attorneys' fees violates a defendant's right to counsel of choice); Ianniello, 644 F.
Supp. 452 (holding that the third party forfeiture provisions of CFA do not apply to attorneys' fees);
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (same); and Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (same) with Simels, 605 F. Supp.
839, supra note 8 (holding that the third party forfeiture provisions of CFA apply to attorneys' fees).
This note addresses some of the issues surrounding the forfeiture of
attorneys' fees under the present provisions of CFA. Part I recounts the
development of CFA. Part II summarizes the opinions of the federal
courts and the Justice Department on the proper interpretation of CFA's
third party forfeiture provisions. Part III examines the sixth amendment
implications of the forfeiture of attorneys' fees under CFA, and con-
dudes that CFA's third party forfeiture provisions would violate a de-
fendant's right to counsel if applied to bona fide attorneys' fees. Part IV
notes that while bona fide attorneys' fees should not be subject to forfei-
ture under CFA, sham attorneys' fees should be. Part IV also proposes
an amendment to CFA which would provide for post-conviction attor-
neys' fee hearings to determine if the transfer of attorneys' fees was a
sham, and thus subject to forfeiture. Finally, Part V concludes that this
amendment constitutes a workable change to CFA, protecting the de-
fendant's constitutional rights while preserving the spirit of CFA.
I. The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984
In 1970, Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act' 3 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute. 14
Congress designed these statutes to attack the foundation of sophisti-
cated racketeering and drug trafficking operations.' 5 Noting that profit
was the motivation for these crimes, Congress believed that the only way
to combat racketeering and drug trafficking successfully was to erode the
economic power bases that supported these operations.' 6 The tradi-
tional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment were inadequate to
accomplish this goal so Congress reintroduced the sanction of criminal
forfeiture to the American criminal justice system.1
7
Despite the severity of the sanction, the criminal forfeiture provi-
sions of RICO and CCE were not very effective.' 8 The General Account-
ing Office issued a report finding that the major reasons for the failure of
the forfeiture provisions were: (1) that federal law enforcement agencies
did not pursue forfeiture often, and (2) that the forfeiture provisions
were poorly drafted, containing numerous limitations and ambiguities
which impeded the use of forfeiture.' 9
13 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
14 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982).
15 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 191, eprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3374.
16 Id.
17 Id. Criminal forfeiture is an in personam proceeding. To avail itself of criminal forfeiture, the
government brings one action which combines the forfeiture proceeding with the prosecution of the
offense giving rise to the forfeiture. Id. at 197. This action encompasses all forfeitable assets.
Under civil forfeiture, the government must bring an in rem proceeding in the district where the
property is located. Id. at 193. Because criminal forfeiture allows the government to obtain the
forfeiture of all assets in one action, it is a more efficient method of obtaining forfeitable assets. Id.
18 COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSET FORFEITURE-A SELDOM
USED TOOL IN COMBATFING DRUG TRAFFICKING 9-15 (1981) (government's record in taking the profit
out of organized crime was far below Congress' expectations). See generally ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION, A COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RICO LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION
90 n.95 (1985) (statistics on RICO and CCE forfeitures from 1970-80).
19 COMPTROLLER GENERAL, supra note 18, noted in S. REP. No. 225, supra note 15, at 191.
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In response to the shortcomings of the forfeiture provisions in
RICO and CCE, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of
1984.20 Congress designed CFA both to clarify and to expand the forfei-
ture provisions of RICO and CCE.21 In developing CFA, Congress iden-
tified as one of the major shortcomings of the existing criminal forfeiture
provisions the failure of the provisions to cover assets that the defendant
transferred or concealed prior to conviction.2 2 To deal with this prob-
lem, Congress included in CFA a provision which stated that the title to
property subject to criminal forfeiture under RICO and CCE vests in the
United States upon commission of the offense which triggers the forfei-
ture action.23 Under this "relation back" or "taint" theory, the govern-
ment can obtain forfeiture of assets from third party transferees if those
assets would have been subject to forfeiture if held by the defendant.
24
However, Congress did not want this provision to justify the forfei-
ture of assets acquired by innocent bona fide purchasers. 25 CFA pro-
vides for a post-conviction ancillary hearing at which a third party who is
holding property subject to forfeiture may apply for relief.26 Under the
20 18 U.S.C. § 1963, 21 U.S.C. § 853 (Supp. III 1985).
21 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 15, at 192.
22 Id. at 195. Although the criminal forfeiture provisions did authorize the court to issue an
order restraining the postindictment transfer of assets, neither RICO nor CCE provided any stan-
dards for the issuance of a restraining order. Id.
23 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c), 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. III 1985). The identical language in these two
statutes states:
(c) All right, title, and interest in property . . . vests in the United States upon the
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section. Any such property that is
subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a
special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States,
unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection [(m) under RICO, (n)
under CCE] that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of
purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture
under this section.
24 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c), 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. III 1985); supra note 23.
25 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 15, at 201.
26 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m), 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (Supp. III 1985). These identical provisions state, in
pertinent part:
(2) Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in property which
has been ordered forfeited to the United States pursuant to this section may, within thirty
days of the final publication of notice or his receipt of notice.., whichever is earlier, peti-
tion the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property.
The hearing shall be held before the court alone, without a jury.
(5) At the hearing, the petitioner may testify and present evidence and witnesses on his
own behalf, and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. The United States
may present evidence and witnesses in rebuttal and in defense of its claim to the property
and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing.
(6) If, after the hearing, the court determines that the petitioner has established by a
preponderance of the evidence that-
(A) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, and such right,
title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the
right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was
superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of
the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture under this section; or
(B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value ofthe right, title, or interest in
the property and was at the time of purchase reasonably without cause to believe that
the property was subject to forfeiture under this section;
the court shall amend the order of forfeiture in accordance with its determination.
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ancillary hearing provisions, a third party can prevail in asserting a legal
interest superior to that of the United States in one of two ways. The
third party can show that he had a legal interest in the property, superior
to that of the defendant, at the time the crime was committed.2 7 In the
alternative, the third party must prove that he was a bona fide purchaser
for value who had no reason to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture.
28
With these new provisions, Congress hoped to clarify RICO and
CCE and thereby reduce the questions surrounding their enforcement.
Instead, the enactment of CFA has generated new questions, some of
which challenge the constitutionality of the Act itself.
II. Interpreting CFA: Are Attorneys' Fees Subject to Forfeiture?
Under a literal reading of CFA, the third party forfeiture provisions
apply to attorneys' fees paid by the defendant to his defense counsel in a
RICO or CCE trial.29 Indeed, the Justice Department has issued guide-
lines on the forfeiture of attorneys' fees under CFA.30 Many defense at-
torneys, however, claim that CFA, as applied to attorneys' fees, violates a
defendant's constitutional rights. 31 The courts are split on the issue of
whether or not CFA applies to attorneys' fees.
32
A. Judicial Interpretations
The trend in the courts has been to hold that CFA does not, and was
not intended to, apply to bona fide attorneys' fees. 33 The earliest case
concerning the application of CFA's third party forfeiture provisions to
attorneys' fees is United States v. Rogers.34 In Rogers, the government filed
a petition for a restraining order to prevent some RICO defendants from
transferring certain assets.35 Counsel for the defendants, making condi-
tional appearances, filed motions to exclude attorneys' fees from forfei-
ture.3 6 The court held that funds paid to an attorney for legitimately
rendered services were not subject to forfeiture under CFA.3
7
The Rogers court first considered the actual language of the statute.3 8
The court found that the language indicated that Congress intended to
If the third party's claim under these provisions fails, he may petition the Attorney General for
mitigation or remission of the forfeiture order. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(h)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 853(i)(1)
(Supp. III 1985). However, the Attorney General's decision is not subject to judicial review. See
United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
27 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (Supp. III 1985); supra note 26.
28 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)(6)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (Supp. III 1985); supra note 26.
29 See, e.g., D.O.J. Guidlines, supra note 9, at 3001 (stating that attorneys' fees are subject to third
party forfeiture under CFA). But see, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985)
(holding that CFA's third party forfeiture provisions do not apply to attorneys' fees).
30 D.O.J. Guidelines, supra note 9.
31 See, e.g., Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 10; N.Y. Bar Rep., supra note 2.
32 See cases cited supra note 12.
33 See United States v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Badalamenti,
614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); and Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332. See also supra notes 8 & 12.
34 602 F. Supp. 1332. See supra notes 8 & 12.
35 602 F. Supp. at 1334.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1349.
38 Id. at 1346.
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treat assets in the hands of third parties differently from assets in the
hands of the defendant.39 The statute did not, however, state specifically
whether attorneys' fees were forfeitable.
40
In the absence of clear statutory language, the court turned to CFA's
legislative history.4 1 According to the legislative history, the purpose of
the third party forfeiture provisions was to "permit the voiding of certain
pre-conviction transfers and so close a potential loophole in current laws
whereby the criminal forfeiture sanction could be avoided by transfers
that were not 'arms' length' transactions." 42 The Rogers court inter-
preted that statement to mean that the government could only obtain
forfeiture of third party assets that were transferred as part of a sham.
43
According to the court, an attorney who receives funds for rendering le-
gitimate services is not engaged in a sham.44
The court also noted that application of CFA to obtain forfeiture of
attorneys' fees might interfere with the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel.45 To avoid declaring the third party forfeiture provi-
sions of CFA unconstitutional and to carry out its interpretation of CFA's
legislative intent, the Rogers court held that assets transferred to an attor-
ney for rendering legitimate services were not subject to forfeiture under
CFA.46
The second court to address this issue specifically rejected the hold-
ing in Rogers. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (hereinafter
Simels), 47 a defendant being prosecuted under CCE moved for a motion
to quash a trial subpoena served on his defense counsel.48 While the
holding in Simels concerned only the constitutionality of issuing a sub-
poena to the defendant's counsel,49 the court discussed the forfeiture of
39 Id. at 1347.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 15, at 200-01.
43 602 F. Supp. at 1347. The Rogers court also based this interpretation of the third party forfei-
ture provisions of CFA on a footnote to the legislative history of CFA. The footnote stated that
"[t]he provision should be construed to deny relief [only] to third parties acting as nominees of the
defendant or who have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent transactions." S. REP. No. 225,
supra note 15, at 209 n.47, cited in Rogers, 620 F. Supp. at 1347 (the parenthetical "only" was added
by the Rogers court). But cf. Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980) ("[I]t would be a
strange canon of statutory construction that would require Congress to state in committee reports or
elsewhere in its deliberations that which is obvious on the face of a statute.").
44 602 F. Supp. at 1347. The defendant makes a sham transfer when he transfers assets to avoid
their forfeiture.
45 Id. See also infra notes 78-140 and accompanying text.
The court cited an earlier draft of provisions dealing with in personam forfeiture. The draft
stated that "[n]othing in this section is intended to interfere with a person's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel." H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19 n.1 (1984), quoted in Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. at 1347.
46 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
47 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y., rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985). See supra notes
8 & 12.
48 The subpoena called for the attorney to produce documentary evidence relating to his fee
arrangement and payments received from the defendant. 605 F. Supp. at 844.
49 While the constitutionality of issuing a subpoena to the defendant's attorney in a RICO or
CCE case is an interesting topic, it is beyond the scope of this note. For sources addressing that
topic, see generally Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 198; Simels, 605 F. Supp. 839, supra note 8; N.Y. Bar
Rep., supra note 2, at 495-502. See also D.O.J. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3007.
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attorneys' fees as well.50 The Simels court stated that the Rogers decision,
limiting the forfeiture of attorneys' fees to sham transactions, was con-
trary to the legislative history of CFA.5 1 According to the court, an attor-
ney who has seen his client's indictment has notice that the client's assets
are subject to forfeiture and therefore the attorney may be subject to
third party forfeiture under CFA.5 2 The court also found that Congress
clearly intended the courts to resolve the conflict between the CFA for-
feiture provisions and the sixth amendment.53  The Simels court con-
cluded that to allow the defendant to use forfeitable assets "to obtain the
services of the Rolls-Royce of attorneys ... would undermine the pur-
pose of forfeiture statutes, which is to strip offenders and organizations
of their economic power."
54
In a very similar case, a court agreed with the reasoning of the Rogers
court and rejected the Simels court's position on whether the government
could obtain forfeiture of a defendant's attorneys' fees. In United States v.
Badalamenti,55 the attorney for a defendant being prosecuted under
RICO and CCE moved to quash a subpoena served on him. The sub-
poena required the attorney to testify about his fee arrangement with his
client.56 The Badalamenti court held that the government could not rely
on possible attorneys' fee forfeiture as the basis of the subpoena because
the third party forfeiture provisions of CFA do not apply to bona fide
attorneys' fees.57 Rather than relying on the legislative history of CFA,
the court determined that the application of CFA to forfeit attorneys'
fees would violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. 58
Because Congress could not have intended the act to be unconstitu-
tional, the court reasoned that CFA did not apply to bona fide attorneys'
fees.59
The most recent case addressing the issue of attorneys' fee forfeiture
under CFA is United States v. Harvey.6o In Harvey, three district court cases
were consolidated for appeal on issues respecting CFA's forfeiture provi-
sions.61 In two of the cases, the district courts followed the Rogers deci-
sion and held that Congress did not intend the third party forfeiture
50 605 F. Supp. at 849 n.14, supra note 8 (one of the government's interests in obtaining the fee
information was to seek the forfeiture of attorneys' fees).
51 Id.
52 Id. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m), 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (Silpp. I1 1985); supra note 26.
53 The court criticized the Rogers court's reliance on H.R. REP. No. 845, supra note 45. The Simels
court quoted the next sentence of the report: "The Committee, therefore, does not resolve the
conflict in the District Court opinions on the use of restraining orders that impinge on a person's
right to retain counsel in a criminal case." H.R. REP. No. 845, supra note 45, at 19 n.1; 605 F. Supp.
at 850 n.14, supra note 8.
54 Simels, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14, supra note 8.
55 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See supra notes 8 & 12.
56 614 F. Supp. at 195. Cf. supra note 49 (citing to sources which discuss the constitutionality of
such a subpoena).
57 614 F. Supp. at 198.
58 Id. See also infra notes 78-140 and accompanying text.
59 614 F. Supp. at 198.
60 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 8 & 12.
61 The cases heard on appeal were United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986);
United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986); and United States v. Harvey, No.
CR-85-224-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 8, 1985).
1987] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
provisions of CFA to encompass bona fide attorneys' fees.62 The Harvey
court specifically rejected this interpretation of CFA.63
The court noted that when a court is interpreting a statute, it may
look to the legislative history for guidance only if the statute is unclear or
subject to different interpretations. 64 Similarly, the Harvey court found
that a court may only choose an interpretation consistent with constitu-
tionality over an interpretation of unconstitutionality if the statute is suf-
ficiently ambiguous to permit a choice between the two. 65 The court
found that the statutory language of CFA's third party forfeiture provi-
sions was unambiguous and clearly encompassed even bona fide attor-
neys' fees. 66 The court went on to find that, under certain circumstances,
application of the CFA forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees would vio-
late a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.67
B. The Justice Department Interpretation
In 1985, the Department of Justice issued guidelines on the forfei-
ture of attorneys' fees.68 The Justice Department insisted that attorneys'
fees were subject to forfeiture under CFA unless the attorney could
prove that he was a bona fide purchaser and was reasonably without
cause to know the assets were subject to forfeiture. 69 TheJustice Depart-
ment stated that the intrusion of the third party forfeiture provisions on a
defendant's right to counsel did not amount to an unconstitutional inter-
62 Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1317; Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. at 1195.
In the third case, Harvey, No. CR-85-224-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 8, 1985), pretrial restraining orders
on the defendant's assets had rendered him effectively indigent. The court appointed counsel for his
defense, and he was subsequently convicted. The defendant appealed on the grounds that the re-
straining orders violated his sixth amendment right to counsel and his fifth amendment due process
rights. 814 F.2d at 912-13. See also infra note 85 (the courts have not resolved the issue of whether
the government may restrain a defendant's assets if that would prevent a defendant from retaining
private counsel).
63 814 F.2d at 918.
64 "When no ambiguity is apparent on the face of a statute, an examination of legislative history
is inappropriate. The proper function of legislative history is to solve, and not create, an ambiguity."
United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1979), quoted in Harvey, 814 F.2d at 916.
65 814 F.2d at 917. See also 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.11 (4th ed. 1984)
(courts are not free to interpret in violation of congressional intent even if that is the only way that
constitutionality may be preserved).
66 814 F.2d at 918 ("Property marked for or paid as attorney fees is necessarily included within
that defined as subject to forfeiture by §§ 1963(a) and (b) for the simple reason that those provisions
define forfeitable property without regard to its intended or actual use."). See also Brickey, Forfeiture
of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REv. 493, 538-
39 (1986) (noting the district courts' findings of ambiguity in the clear language of CFA).
The Harvey court also found that even the legislative history of CFA indicated that all attorneys'
fees would be subject" to forfeiture. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 15, at 196 ("Changes [in the
criminal forfeiture statutes] are necessary both to preserve the availability of a defendant's assets for
criminal forfeiture, and, in those cases in which he does transfer, deplete, or conceal his property, to
assure that he cannot as a result avoid the economic impact of forfeiture."). The Harvey court found
this passage to reflect a clear congressional intent not to limit third party forfeiture to sham
transfers.
67 814 F.2d at 926. The circumstances the court described were when application of the CFA
forfeiture provisions deprive an accused of the ability to employ and pay legitimate attorneys' fees to
private counsel. See also infra notes 90-107 and accompanying text (discussion of the impact of CFA
third party forfeiture provisions on a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel of choice).
68 D.O.J. Guidelines, supra note 9.
69 Id. at 3001.
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ference. 70 It also noted that CFA did not contain any language exempt-
ing attorneys' fees from its coverage. 71 In fact, the legislative history of
CFA cited with approval a pre-CFA case holding that some of a defend-
ant's property was forfeitable even though it was transferred to his attor-
ney prior to conviction.7 2 The Justice Department believed that the
exemption of attorneys' fees would "undermine substantially the pur-
pose of the third party forfeiture provisions.
73
As both the Justice Department and the Harvey court found, a literal
reading of CFA indicates that the third party forfeiture provisions do en-
compass bona fide attorneys' fees.74 However, the Justice Department
and most of the courts that have interpreted CFA's forfeiture provisions
as applied to attorneys' fees have noted that the provisions have some
impact on a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.7 5 It was
CFA's intrusion on a defendant's right to counsel which caused some
district courts to search through CFA's legislative history to support an
interpretation of CFA that excluded bona fide attorneys' fees from forfei-
ture. 76 This intrusion on a defendant's sixth amendment rights also led
the Harvey court to declare CFA's forfeiture provisions unconstitutional
as applied to bona fide attorneys' fees.
77
III. Sixth Amendment Implications of CFA
Most of the courts which have addressed the issue have held that
forfeiture of bona fide attorneys' fees under the present provisions of the
CFA would violate a defendant's sixth amendment
78 right to counsel.79
The potential violation is three-fold in nature; the forfeiture of bona fide
attorneys' fees under CFA would: (1) violate a defendant's right to have
counsel; (2) violate a defendant's right to choice of counsel; and (3) vio-
late a defendant's right to effective counsel.
70 Id. But see infra notes 78-140 and accompanying text.
71 D.OJ. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3003.
72 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 15, at 200 n.28 (dting United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir.
1981)).
However, the facts in this case suggest that the transfer was part of a sham. In Long, the defend-
ant in a CCE case transferred an airplane to his attorney in payment of past debts and as a retainer
for future services. The purchase price of the airplane was $140,000. Thirty thousand dollars of
that amount was for past services; $79,000 was for future services. The lawyer gave the balance,
$31,000, in cash to an unknown messenger. A man known only as "Tony" in the Bahamas trans-
ferred title to the plane to the attorney's partner. The firm tried to sell the plane through trade
magazines, but the issuance of a restraining order stopped the sale.
73 D.O.J. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3003.
74 Id.; and Harvey, 814 F.2d at 914.
75 D.O.J. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3002; Harvey, 814 F.2d at 926; lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 456;
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196; and Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
76 lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 445; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347.
77 814 F.2d at 926.
78 The sixth amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
79 United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp.
452 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States
v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985). Contra Simels, 605 F. Supp. 839, supra note 8.
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A. The Right to Have Counsel
Some courts have found that if the CFA third party forfeiture provi-
sions applied to attorneys' fees, CFA would violate a defendant's sixth
amendment right to have counsel.80 The courts reasoned that the threat
of forfeiture would make it difficult, if not impossible, for a defendant to
secure the services of an attorney,81 The courts doubted that an attorney
would be willing to invest the time and resources required to defend a
RICO or CCE defendant without a better guarantee of payment.8 2
The Justice Department rejected the arguments advanced by the dis-
trict courts.8 3 It stated that a defendant who was effectively rendered
indigent because of the potential forfeiture could still obtain appointed
counsel.8 4 Potential forfeiture of attorneys' fees could effectively render
a defendant indigent if the government issued restraining orders to cover
substantially all of a defendant's assets. The defendant would also be
effectively indigent if the threat of forfeiture dissuaded private attorneys
from accepting a defendant's unrestrained assets.
Some courts have held that appointed counsel would be available
only if the government obtained a restraining order preventing the trans-
fer of substantially all of the defendant's assets.8 5 Thus, defendants
whose assets are not restrained would not qualify for court-appointed
counsel.8 6 The government has also suggested that a defendant could
use nonforfeitable assets to pay his attorney.8 7 This solution would not
80 See lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 456-57; and Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197-98. See generally
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (a person accused of a crime has the right to be assisted by
counsel in his defense). The right to counsel "is of such a character that it cannot be denied without
violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the bases of all our civil and
political institutions.' " Id. at 67 (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)). See also
United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1149 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he right to obtain the assistance
of counsel at all crucial stages is essential if both the symbol and reality of fair trial are to be
preserved.").
81 lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 456; and Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196.
82 Cf lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 454; and Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1332, 1334. The defense attor-
neys in these cases made appearances conditioned on the courts holding that their fees would not be
subject to forfeiture.
As the court in Badalamenti commented, "[b]y the Sixth Amendment we guarantee the defendant
the right of counsel, but by the forfeiture provisions of the RICO and CCE statute... we insure that
no lawyer will accept the business." 614 F. Supp. at 196. See also Chambers, Criminal Lawyers in Study
Say New Laws Inhibited Case Choices, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at A20, col. 1 (a survey of criminal
defense lawyers indicated that some lawyers would refuse to accept RICO and CCE cases because of
the changes in federal law).
83 D.O.J. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3002.
84 Id.
85 Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197. However, the courts have not resolved the issue of whether
the government can restrain all of a defendant's assets when that would prevent the defendant from
retaining counsel. Compare United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
defendant's interests in obtaining counsel of choice and the possible adverse effects of a court's
pretrial refusal to exempt defense counsel fees from forfeiture do not mandate that a trial court
exempt from restraining orders sufficient assets to cover a defendant's attorneys' fees) with Harvey,
814 F.2d 905 (holding that restraining orders that prevent a defendant from hiring and paying pri-
vate counsel violate a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel of choice) and Ianniello, 644 F.
Supp. 452 (modifying a restraining order to enable the defendant to pay his attorneys' fees based on
a holding that legal fees to pay counsel of choice are a necessity in life).
86 Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 197. In any event, having a court appoint counsel does not neces-
sarily remove all sixth amendment problems. See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
87 Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 198; D.OJ. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3002.
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protect a defendant whose assets were all subject to forfeiture.8 8 More-
over, this solution may not be very effective in the light of recent deci-
sions holding that the government need not "trace" money subject to
forfeiture in order to obtain forfeiture of it.89 Therefore, under some
circumstances the third party forfeiture provisions of CFA would deprive
a defendant of his right to have counsel if the provisions were applied to
attorneys' fees.
B. The Right to Choice of Counsel
The right to choice of counsel is related, but is not identical, to the
right to have counsel. Courts have held that the sixth amendment guar-
antees the right to counsel of choice,9 0 but the right is not absolute.9 1 A
defendant's right to choice of counsel is limited by his financial
resources.
92
The Justice Department noted that forfeiture of attorneys' fees im-
pacts on a defendant's right to choose counsel, but stated that the impact
did not amount to an unconstitutional interference.9 3 Because any for-
feitable assets which the defendant holds are the property of the United
States,94 the Justice Department reasoned that a defendant is not being
deprived of his right to choice of counsel if he cannot use forfeitable
funds to pay attorneys' fees.95
The United States does not have title to the assets of a defendant
who is found not guilty, because those assets are not forfeitable. Yet,
CFA's forfeiture provisions may prevent such a defendant from using his
own funds to pay attorneys' fees. 96 Thus, the forfeiture provisions may
88 Cf. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 198 ("The right to counsel belongs to guilty defendants as
well as innocent ones.").
89 "It matters not that the government received the identical money which the defendants re-
ceived as long as the amount that was received in violation of the racketeering statute is known."
United States v. Conner. 752 F.2d 566, 576 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1985) (emphasis in
original). Accord United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 802-03 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1186 (1986); United States v. Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959, 970 (11th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1200 (1986).
90 E.g., Powell, 287 U.S. at 53 ("It is hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being
conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.");
United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1982).
91 See United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069
(1979). See also Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982).
92 E.g., Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984) ("While it is clear that an
accused who is financially able to retain counsel of his own choosing must not be deprived of a
reasonable opportunity to do so, it is also clear that the right to retain counsel of one's choice is not
absolute.").
93 D.OJ. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3002.
94 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c), 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. III 1985); supra note 23.
95 D.O.J. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3002.
96 Restraining orders covering substantially all of the defendant's assets could prevent the de-
fendant from securing private counsel. Cf. supra note 85 (the courts are split on whether the govern-
ment may restrain a defendant's assets if that would prevent him from securing private counsel).
Additionally, the threat of fee forfeiture may cause attorneys to refuse to represent a defendant. See
Chambers, supra note 82 (some lawyers would refuse to accept RICO and CCE cases because of the
changes in federal law).
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deprive a defendant who is found not guilty of his right to choice of
counsel.
97
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Harvey98 defined the right to
counsel of choice as "the right to be free of arbitrary governmental inter-
ference in choosing, paying, and retaining the services of privately re-
tained counsel." 99 The Harvey court found that the right to counsel of
choice was the primary component of the right to counsel, and that the
right to appointed counsel was only a back-up right that an indigent de-
fendant could use. 100 The court stated that the government could not
directly or indirectly deny persons accused of certain crimes, or all
crimes, the right to counsel of choice merely because the accused could
use the back-up right to appointed counsel.10 '
The court proceeded to find that the right to counsel of choice en-
compassed a defendant's right to use his property legitimately to obtain
private counsel, even though the government should later prove that the
property was tainted by criminal conduct. 10 2 According to the court, the
right of a RICO or CCE defendant to counsel of choice overrides the
government's interests in deterrence, in preserving property for forfei-
ture, and in separating a convicted defendant from his economic base.
103
Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that to the extent that CFA's forfeiture
provisions deprived a defendant of the ability to employ and pay private
counsel, CFA was unconstitutional for violating the defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel of choice.
0 4
It is clear that the forfeiture of attorneys' fees would impact on a
RICO or CCE defendant's right to choice of counsel. 10 5 While the Jus-
tice Department claims that the impact does not reach unconstitutional
proportions, 0 6 it appears that the potential forfeiture of attorneys' fees
would unreasonably interfere with the defendant's right to counsel, espe-
cially in cases where the defendant is subsequently found not guilty.'
0 7
Whether a defendant is able to retain counsel of his choice or has ap-
pointed counsel to represent him, the forfeiture of attorneys' fees under
CFA may still interfere with his right to effective counsel.
97 The Justice Department stated that the threat of forfeiture of attorneys' fees does not inter-
fere with the defendant's right to choice of counsel. "If counsel refuses to represent a prospective
client because he believes that the client does not have the financial ability to pay ... there is no
interference with the right to counsel of choice." Id. at 3003 n.7. But, if the threat of forfeiture of
attorneys' fees causes attorneys to refuse to represent a defendant, the forfeiture provisions might
interfere with the defendant's right to have counsel. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
98 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
99 Id. at 924.
100 Id. at 923. The court recognized that the right to counsel of choice might appear unfair and
undemocratic, for some defendants could hire the most experienced attorneys while other defend-
ants would have to settle for much less qualified attorneys. Id.
101 Id. at 924.
102 Id. at 924-25.
103 Id. at 925.
104 Id. at 926.
105 See id.; D.O.J. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3002.
106 D.O.J. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3002.
107 See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
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C. The Right to Effective Counsel
Inherent in a criminal defendant's right to counsel is the right to
effective counsel. 10 8 Some of the courts which have discussed the issue
of forfeiture of attorneys' fees noted the impact of fee forfeiture on the
defendant's right to effective counsel. 10 9 The effect of fee forfeiture dif-
fers depending on whether appointed or private counsel represents the
defendant.
1. Appointed Counsel
The Justice Department stated that the application of CFA's third
party forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees does not affect a defendant's
right to have counsel. 10 A defendant who is effectively rendered indi-
gent by such forfeiture is entitled to appointed counsel."' In contrast,
the Rogers court found that the ability to have counsel appointed "pays
no more than lip service to due process and the right to counsel."
112
The court believed that the defense of RICO and CCE cases requires a
commitment of both time and money beyond the resources of the aver-
age public defender. 313 The Rogers court noted that adequate defense of
a RICO or CCE case also requires representation during grand jury in-
vestigations.114 Because a defendant receives right to counsel "only at or
after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated
against him," 115 counsel appointed at that time (ninety or one hundred
days before trial) is patently inadequate.
16
The logic of this argument is disturbing. It presumes that truly indi-
gent RICO and CCE defendants are not adequately represented by their
appointed counsel. 1 7 This argument suggests that a two-class system of
RICO and CCE defendants exists. Those defendants having property,
whether subject to forfeiture or not, could get adequate counsel; those
not having property would necessarily get inadequate counsel." 8 Pro-
viding a RICO or CCE defendant with appointed counsel does not auto-
matically deny the defendant his right to effective counsel. 19
108 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (one of the latest U.S. Supreme Court cases
defining the right to counsel).
109 Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196; Simels, 605 F. Supp. at 850
n.14, supra note 8; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
110 D.O.J. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3002.
111 Id.
112 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1349-50.
115 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972).
116 Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1350.
117 See Brickey, supra note 66, at 493, 521.
118 This two-class system should not be confused with a system in which both a defendant who
hires his own attorney and a defendant who has appointed counsel receive adequate representation.
119 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (counsel is strongly presumed to have ren-
dered adequate assistance). But see Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 10 at 737, 739-40 (comparing
the use of a public defender in a RICO or CCE case to an outpatient service performing an arterial
bypass).
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2. Private Counsel
Some courts have argued that a defendant in a RICO or CCE case is
denied the right to effective counsel when the defendant hires a private
attorney whose fees are subject to forfeiture.' 20 The two bases for this
argument are: (1) the potential violation of the attorney-client privi-
lege, 121 and (2) the possible conflicts of interest.1 22
The potential violation of the attorney-client privilege arises in the
context of a post-conviction ancillary hearing. If the private attorney
whose fees are subject to forfeiture wishes to challenge the forfeiture, he
must raise the issue in a post-conviction ancillary hearing.123 In order to
prove that he was without reasonable cause to believe that the property
transferred to him was subject to forfeiture, the attorney would have to
disclose any information he might know about the scope and sources of
the defendant's assets.124 Although a third party ancillary hearing occurs
only after a conviction, the attorney's disclosure could affect the defend-
ant's appeal. 125 Also, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to
encourage free and open communication between the attorney and his
client. 126 The threat of the attorney disclosing privileged information
would chill the free flow of information between the RICO or CCE de-
fendant and his attorney. 127 Thus, it would impinge on the defendant's
right to effective counsel. 1
28
The forfeiture of private attorneys' fees under the present provisions
of CFA also raises conflicts of interest problems. The attorney's interest
in preserving his fees would conflict with the defendant's interest in pre-
serving his assets and his freedom. 129 This conflict could manifest itself
in several forms. The attorney's obligation to be well informed about his
client's case would conflict with the attorney's interest in not learning
facts that would endanger his fee. 130 If a defendant was offered a plea
bargain which excluded the forfeiture of attorneys' fees, the attorney
might be tempted to accept the bargain even if it was not in the best
interests of the defendant.13 ' On the other hand, if the plea bargain was
in the best interests of the defendant but did not exclude forfeiture of
120 lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196; Simels, 605 F. Supp. at 850
n.14, supra note 8; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349. See also D.O.J. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3003.
121 See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
123 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m), 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (Supp. III 1985). See also supra note 26.
124 See lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349. Information relating to fees is
not generally privileged. United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 1974). How-
ever, it may be privileged if its disclosure would implicate the client in a crime. See In re GrandJury
Investigation, 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981); United States v.
Ponder, 475 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973).
125 Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
126 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
127 lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349. See also D.O.J. Guidelines, supra note
9, at 3003.
128 Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457; Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
129 Simels, 605 F. Supp. at 850 n.14, supra note 8.
130 Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196.
131 lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196-97. See also Brickey, supra note
66, at 534; Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 10, at 741; N.Y. Bar Rep., supra note 2, at 483.
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attorneys' fees, the attorney might refuse it in the hopes of getting an
acquittal. 13
2
The attorney's interests may also conflict with public policy con-
cerns. Two courts and a few commentators have suggested that an attor-
ney who agrees to represent a defendant in the face of possible forfeiture
may be accused of accepting the case on a contingency basis.'3 3 If the
defendant is acquitted, the attorney keeps his fee. If the defendant is
convicted, the attorney's fee may be subject to forfeiture. Although the
possibility of fee forfeiture upon a defendant's conviction does not create
a true contingency fee arrangement, 13 4 the defendant's attorney would
possess the same motivation to procure an acquittal as he would under a
true contingency arrangement.' 3 5 Consequently, even though fee forfei-
ture does not create a contingency fee arrangement per se, in effect it still
produces a conflict between the attorneys' interests and public policy.
A defendant who has court appointed counsel in a RICO or CCE
case is not necessarily deprived of his right to effective counsel. But, a
defendant who hires private counsel could be deprived of this same right
if the third party forfeiture provisions of CFA were applied to attorneys'
fees. In addition to its impact on the right to effective counsel, the CFA
would violate the defendant's constitutional rights to have counsel and to
choose counsel if the third party forfeiture provisions encompass bona
fide attorneys' fees.
In response to these problems, the Justice Department issued guide-
lines on the forfeiture of attorneys' fees.' 3 6 Under these guidelines, the
Justice Department will not use information from confidential communi-
cations between the client and his attorney to establish that the attorney
had reasonable cause to know that assets which the defendant trans-
ferred to him were subject to forfeiture. 37 While adherence to the
guidelines could eliminate CFA's interference with the attorney-client
privilege and diffuse some of the conflicts of interest, 138 they are largely
ineffective. The guidelines are solely for the purpose of guidance; they
do not bind the government.' 39 Additionally, the Justice Department be-
132 lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 1197. See also Brickey, supra note 66, at 534; N.Y. Bar Rep., supra note
2, at 482.
133 lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457; Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196. See also Reed, Criminal Forfeiture
Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: Raising the Stakes, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 747, 778 (1984);
N.Y. Bar Rep., supra note 2, at 482.
Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILY DR 2-106(C) (1980) ("A lawyer shall not
enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a
criminal case."); MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d)(2) (1983); RESTATEMENT OF
CoNTRAcTs § 542 (1929) (contingent fees in criminal cases are illegal and unenforceable under con-
tract law as against public policy).
134 If the government should obtain forfeiture of the attorney's fees, presumably the attorney
would have an outstanding debt against the defendant.
135 The defendant may have insufficient nonforfeitable assets with which to pay the debt. Cer-
tainly an attorney would want to avoid the expense of collecting such a debt.
136 D.O.J. Guidelines, supra note 9.
137 Id. at 3005. Cf. United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1474 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he defense
attorney's necessary knowledge of the charges against his client cannot defeat his interest in receiv-
ing payment out of the defendant's forfeited assets for legitimate legal services.").
138 See Brickey, supra note 66, at 537-38 (noting that adherence to these guidelines should reduce
the conflicts of interest problems associated with the forfeiture of attorneys' fees).
139 D.O. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 3001.
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lieves that bona fide fees may be subject to forfeiture. 140 The guidelines
do not correct CFA's effect on a RICO or CCE defendant's right to have
and right to choose counsel. Thus, even adopting the Justice Depart-
ment's guidelines, CFA's third party forfeiture provisions may violate a
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel if applied to bona fide at-
torneys' fees.
IV. Amending CFA
While CFA's third party forfeiture provisions should be declared un-
constitutional as applied to bona fide legal fees, most courts have noted
that such a ruling would not prevent the forfeiture of attorneys' fees
transferred as part of a sham.141 The CFA third party forfeiture provi-
sions were designed to prevent the defendant from making a sham trans-
fer to a third party.142 For the most part they are effective, but not as
applied to the defendant's attorney in a RICO or CCE trial, because they
do not distinguish between bona fide and sham attorneys' fees. The for-
feiture of bona fide attorneys' fees under CFA would violate a defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to counsel.143 The difficulty lies in
designing an amendment to CFA that would provide for the forfeiture of
sham attorneys' fees while protecting the defendant's right to counsel.
Some commentators have suggested a pretrial hearing to determine
whether the assets with which the defendant proposes to pay an attorney
are subject to forfeiture.144 A pretrial hearing would provide early reso-
lution of the attorneys' fee forfeiture issue. The defendant's attorney
could then proceed to trial without any subsequent threat to his fee.
This solution would eliminate any conflict of interest problems during
the trial. At the pretrial hearing, the court could also determine whether
the defendant is rendered effectively indigent because all of his assets are
subject to forfeiture. Then the court might appoint counsel to represent
the defendant, removing the right to counsel problems.
45
However, the pretrial hearing solution creates other problems. At
the hearing, the government would be required to disclose much of its
case in order to show that the assets with which the defendant wishes to
pay his attorney are subject to forfeiture. Considering the complexity of
a RICO or CCE case, the added time and expense of a pretrial hearing of
140 Id. at 3003.
141 E.g., United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. lanniello, 644 F.
Supp. 452, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 198 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); United States v. Rogers, 606 F. Supp. 1332, 1348 (D. Colo. 1985). A sham transfer is one
which the defendant makes for the purpose of avoiding forfeiture.
142 S. REP No. 225, supra note 15, at 209 n.47.
143 See supra notes 78-140 (discussion of the impact of CFA's third party forfeiture provisions on a
defendant's right to counsel).
144 E.g., Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1184
(1986); Note, Criminal Forfeiture of Attorneys Fees Under RICO and CCE, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHIcs &
PUB. POL'Y 541, 575 (1986); Comment, Today's RICO and Your Disappearing Legal Fee, 15 CAP. U.L.
REV. 59, 89 (1985).
145 But see lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 457 (noting that a defendant with money available to pay an
attorney could not swear under oath that he, the defendant, was financially unable to obtain counsel
as required before the court will appoint counsel). See also id. at 458 ("Any restraint of defendants'
assets which render defendants unable to pay their counsel affects their right to choice of counsel.").
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this type could be substantial. Additionally, if the defendant is later ac-
quitted, the hearing will have been unnecessary. While a pretrial hearing
might protect the defendant's right to counsel and prevent a defendant
from making a sham transfer of forfeitable assets to his attorney, the dis-
advantages of a pretrial hearing prevent it from being the ideal solution.
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Harvey 146 and at least one com-
mentator have suggested that the government should have to prove that
the attorneys' fees were transferred as part of a sham before it can obtain
their forfeiture. 147 However, this proposition puts a heavy burden on the
government and is not in keeping with the spirit of the third party forfei-
ture provisions of CFA. Congress designed the provisions so that if a
third party wants to protect the assets transferred to him, he has the bur-
den of proving that he falls within one of the CFA exemptions. 148 Thus,
when the forfeiture of attorneys' fees is in question, the attorney, and not
the government, should have the burden of proving that the defendant's
legal fees were not transferred as part of a sham.
A workable amendment to CFA should provide for a post-conviction
attorneys' fee hearing. If the trial jury should find that the assets trans-
ferred to the defendant's attorney are subject to forfeiture, the govern-
ment would have a presumption of forfeitability of the assets. At the
post-trial hearing, the attorney would have to prove that the assets were
not transferred as part of a sham. To meet this burden of proof, the
attorney would have to show at the post-conviction hearing that the
transferred assets constituted a reasonable fee for his services.
The judge presiding over the hearing should determine the reasona-
bleness of the fee in view of the actual services performed by the attorney
in connection with the case and in view of the services which the attorney
might have anticipated rendering at the outset of the case. The judge
should also consider the fees that the defendant's attorney is accustomed
to receiving in similar cases. 149 The government would be entitled to
challenge the defense attorney's evidence regarding his fee. If the judge
should find that the fee is reasonable, the attorney will be allowed to
retain the full fee. On the other hand, if the judge should find that the
fee is excessive, the judge may require the attorney to forfeit that amount
which exceeds the judge's estimate of a reasonable fee. In the event that
the judge should find that the fee is so excessive as to indicate a sham
transfer or that the mode of the transfer indicates a sham,' 5 0 the judge
should require the attorney to forfeit the entire fee.
146 814 F.2d 905. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
147 814 F.2d at 928; and Note, The 1984 RICO Amendments: Will Defendants and Their Attorneys Be
Short Changed?, 18 PAc. LJ. 31, 56-57 (1986).
148 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m), 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (Supp. III 1985); supra note 26.
149 The court should avoid imposing a standard "reasonable" hourly fee, such as the $80 hourly
fee suggested by the government in lanniello, 644 F. Supp. at 458. See N.Y. Bar Rep., supra note 2, at
523-24 ("The problem with the fixed amount is that, over time, it becomes outmoded; the problem
with the low amount is that it discourages counsel from doing the appropriate amount of work on a
case.").
150 Cf. United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981) (the government obtained forfeiture of
an asset transferred to the defendant's attorney where the facts of the transfer indicated that it was
done as part of a sham). See also supra note 72.
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Because such a hearing would take place after conviction, the gov-
ernment would not have to disclose its case before the RICO or CCE
trial in order to obtain forfeiture of the defendant's attorneys' fees. The
fee hearing will only occur after the defendant has been convicted and
the jury has found that the assets transferred to the defendant's attorney
are subject to forfeiture. Thus, the costs associated with the hearing will
be incurred only when necessary. The hearing should not be unduly bur-
densome to the court as CFA already provides for post-conviction hear-
ings to determine the ultimate forfeitability of assets transferred to third
parties.
The new post-conviction fee hearing provision would be effective in
preventing sham transfers from the defendant to his attorney. And even
if the attorney is allowed to retain his fee, the defendant will be stripped
of his economic base. 5 1 The new amendment would also protect the
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. In the absence of a sham
transfer, reasonable attorneys' fees are protected from forfeiture. The
attorney will not have to testify about any confidential information. Be-
cause his fees will not generally be subject to forfeiture, the attorney's
interests will not be in conflict with either the interests of his client or the
interests of public policy. Therefore, a defendant should have little diffi-
culty locating a competent lawyer who will be willing and able to repre-
sent him effectively.
V. Conclusion
If the third party forfeiture provisions of CFA apply to bona fide
attorneys' fees, a defendant is deprived of his sixth amendment right to
counsel. Therefore, the government cannot use the third party forfeiture
provisions of CFA to obtain forfeiture of bona fide attorneys' fees. As-
sets that the defendant transfers to his attorney as part of a sham are
subject to third party forfeiture, but CFA does not presently include pro-
visions under which the government may obtain the forfeiture of sham
fees. A new amendment to CFA which provides for a post-conviction fee
hearing would allow the government to obtain forfeiture of sham attor-
neys' fees while protecting the defendant's right to counsel.
Sharon R. O'Keefe
151 Cf. S. REp. No. 225, supra note 15, at 191 (stating that the purpose of the forfeiture mecha-
nisms of RICO and CCE is to strip offenders of their economic power bases).
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